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Abstract 
A pragmatic, but focused, pursuit by British policy-makers of an alliance is often regarded 
as a central element in the genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty. Analysis of the issue of 
Scandinavian membership shows that British policy was actually not consistent regarding 
either means or ends. It was subject to internal debate, based upon conflicting assumptions 
in the Oslo embassy, the Foreign Office and the armed forces. The FO’s main concern was 
to provide Norway and Denmark with a sense of security so that they would take measures 
against internal subversion, while the military was more concerned to prevent British 
military resources being overstretchedand were prepared to accept Scandinavian neutrality: 
they wished if possible to keep the Cold War out of Scandinavia. Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin and the FO did not believe this was possible, nor necessarily desirable, but were less 
than wholehearted about Norway and Denmark joining the pact on their own.  Even in early 
1949, when Soviet pressure was applied to Norway, Britain was ambivalent about whether 
Norway should be a founder-member of NATO.  Although Britain strongly desired the 
alliance for long-term gains, they worked hard to ensure the form it took worked to meet 
their short-term needs.  
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A key stage in the process that culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty and the foundation 
of NATO was the agreement of United States Secretary of State George Marshall to a 
British proposal of secret talks on a North Atlantic security arrangement in March 1948.
1
 
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had gained Marshall’s attention by stressing the 
vulnerability of Norway to Soviet aggression. However, for scholars of British foreign 
policy or historians of NATO, this pivotal moment has always been placed in the context of 
British relations with the US or Western Europe: British views of Scandinavian security at 
the time are rarely subject to any detailed analysis in this historiography.
2
 This paper will 
show that whatever the significance of the issue as the trigger for the opening of 
negotiations for the North Atlantic alliance, there were considerable British reservations 
with regard to incorporating Norway and Denmark in such an alliance. Analysing this issue 
reveals opportunism and, at times, incoherence, in British policy and highlights the 
conflicting range of aspirations and imperatives that shaped it at a time when Britain had a 
crucial impact on the development of the international system.  
If for historians of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Scandinavian aspect tends to slip 
into the background after Bevin’s appeal to Marshall, this not the case for historians of 
Scandinavian foreign relations, who discuss this period extensively. The years 1948-49 saw 
a dramatic reorientation of the place of the Nordic states in world affairs. Norwegians, 
Danes and Swedes argued over whether they should be involved with any western bloc, and 
if so, on what terms. Scholars have debated in detail about the motivations of Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark as they engaged in talks on a defence pact between May 1948 and 
January 1949.
3
 At issue in particular are two related matters: first, whether the alliance 
Sweden proposed in May 1948, ostensibly a break with a 135-year policy of isolationist 
neutrality, was sincere, or merely a ruse to prevent Norway and Denmark joining an alliance 
with Britain and the United States and drawing Scandinavia into the developing Cold War. 
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Second, on the Norwegian side, there is much discussion as to whether there was ever a 
possibility of Norway joining any pact with Sweden that prevented such an alignment to the 
west. It has been suggested in some quarters that Norway’s Foreign Secretary Halvard 
Lange manipulated Norwegian contacts with the west – especially those in Britain that had 
been built up during wartime cooperation – to undermine the talks. Other analysts point out 
that there was a range of opinions in both countries that might have made compromise 
possible.
4
 Danish scholars have argued that Denmark, feeling particularly exposed to the 
Soviet threat, saw Sweden as a more likely protector than the more distant US, and played a 
key role in keeping the talks going.
5
 There is a general consensus that the outcome – 
Norway and Denmark full members of  NATO and Sweden neutral – was a consequence of 
internal factors, geostrategic position and historical traditions rather than international 
pressure.
6
 
This scholarship has made much use of British sources. Britain is depicted as keenly 
interested in Scandinavian security. Some scholars see Britain as positioning itself between 
Scandinavia and the US, both politically and economically, and seeking a ‘middle way’ in 
policy terms.
7
 Others argue Britain and the US were determined in 1948-49 to draw 
Scandinavia – or at the least Norway and Denmark and their Atlantic territories – away 
from neutrality and into the Cold War.
8
 Much attention given in these studies to a strategy 
developed in the British Foreign Office (FO) Northern Department, commonly called the 
Hankey plan, designed to link a Scandinavian defence alliance with the North Atlantic 
security group, but without involving neutralist Sweden in full-scale commitments. A basic 
assumption is made that Britain saw the defence of Scandinavia to be a vital interest, and 
was motivated by fear of a Soviet invasion of the region.
9
 
This article will revise these interpretations of British policy. It approaches the issue 
of Scandinavian involvement in the North Atlantic alliance as an issue in an internal British 
debate about the nature of the enterprise on which they were embarked. It will demonstrate 
that assumptions by Scandinavians that they were unequivocally wanted in the Atlantic 
pact, were not universally true across the British government.
10
 It will show that contrary to 
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the way it tends to be presented in conventional narratives, especially Bevincentric ones, 
there was no consensus across the government. Probably the most influential figure on 
British handling of the Scandinavian issue was not Bevin, but a man seldom featuring in 
any of the accounts of NATO’s foundation, Sir Laurence Collier, the British Ambassador at 
Oslo.  
 Accounts of the US road to the North Atlantic Treaty highlight the debates within 
the US government and Congress. The literature on Scandinavia’s relationship with the 
west likewise focuses on internal political differences as well as deep divisions between the 
Nordic powers. In contrast, analysis of British policy in this period has been more 
preoccupied with Bevin himself, and his aims regarding Britain’s world role, in relation to 
ideas of a ‘third force’ based on Western Europe and the colonial empires. Accounts of the 
British contribution to the creation of NATO say much about the way the British responded 
to their information about these internal debates elsewhere, and less about any fundamental 
areas of divergence within the British government.
11
  Where differences are noted, the 
implication is that consensus was easily reached, because of commitment to the pragmatic 
achievement of the overall goal of a formal alliance with the US. Analysis of the 
Scandinavian issue in British policy debates shows that this conveys a mistaken impression, 
and overlooks the way British policy was affected by internal disagreements that were not 
easily resolved. The nexus of debate was between the views most strongly held by Collier 
on the one hand, and the military Chiefs of Staff (COS) on the other. It shows that short-
term imperatives based on financial limitations were key factors in the debate that were not 
simply set aside in favour of longer-term geopolitical objectives.
12
 British policy wound up 
an uneasy compromise between the two. This puts the Hankey plan in a new perspective, as 
a compromise not only between different attitudes in the Nordic countries but also as a 
compromise of internal British viewpoints. 
 
The British dilemma 
In 1947, the British government faced serious economic problems as a consequence of the 
Second World War. Britain had lost almost a quarter of its pre-war wealth. The destruction 
of productive capacity and the need for reconversion of what was left for peacetime 
production, the liquidation of overseas assets and the loss of export markets meant a 
shortage of foreign currency. Overseas debts had risen sevenfold. This put a premium on 
exports, which necessitated a domestic policy of austerity and continued rationing. This 
situation was aggravated by the terms of the American loan approved by Congress on 15 
July 1946, which required sterling to be freely convertible in mid-1947. World commodity 
shortages pushed up prices of western hemisphere products. This reduced the real value of 
the loan and meant that it was effectively exhausted by the end of 1947. Before then. the 
harsh winter of 1946-47 had precipitated an economic crisis, with fuel shortages cutting 
production and increasing the dollar gap. There was intense debate within the Cabinet as to 
whether in this situation Britain could afford to maintain its extensive overseas 
commitments. These derived not only from its empire (the cost of forces in India and Egypt 
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produced debts of £335 million), but also from its duties as one of the victorious powers, 
such as the administration of occupation zones in Germany and Austria. In 1947, the cost of 
the occupation of Britain’s zone in Germany approached £130 million. Bevin believed that 
Britain should do so, and moreover argued that he needed credible military strength to back 
up his foreign policy, especially with growing discord with the USSR in many areas. 
Conversely, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, argued that Britain’s economic 
recovery took precedence, and sought to cut occupation costs and overseas defence 
activities as much as possible. A start was made with the cuts to aid to Greece and Turkey 
in February 1947, which resulted in the US announcement of the Truman Doctrine. In 
April, Bevin warned Marshall that the burden of British commitments was ‘proving almost 
more than we can bear.’13  
 Britain’s defence dilemma was therefore to find a way of maintaining the credibility 
of British power, as well as the actual ability to act where British interests required it, within 
the limited means available as a result of the financial crisis – a crisis which worsened 
through the course of 1947 and which US aid provided through the Marshall Plan would 
only resolve in the longer-term. The task of the British military leaders – the three Chiefs of 
Staff  – was to develop a plausible imperial and national defence strategy within these 
budgetary constraints. They found it a virtually impossible task, but under repeated pressure 
from Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Dalton and Minister of Defence A. V. Alexander, they 
developed a strategic concept based on a pared-down view of Britain’s vital interests. These 
were defined in mid-1947 as consisting of three pillars: defence of the United Kingdom 
itself, defence of sea communications to the empire and the United States, and defence of 
the Middle East.
14
 
 The defence of the United Kingdom against an attack by the USSR (the only 
potential enemy considered) required some defence in depth on the continent of Europe. 
However, partly as a result of the financial constraints, but partly too as a result of the 
lessons they drew from the Battle of Britain, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force chiefs, 
Admiral John Cunningham and Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, succeeded in getting the COS 
committee, against misgivings by Army chief Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, to agree 
that Britain could defend itself, so long as none of its strength had been sacrificed in the 
defence of Western Europe. There would be ‘no more Dunkirks’.15  
 Even with this proviso, it was recognised that the only plausible solution to Britain’s 
defence dilemma, if withdrawal from its global role was not to be considered an option, was 
to get the US to commit itself to fulfil some of the military duties that the British did not 
wish (or could not afford) to undertake, such as the despatch of large-scale reinforcements 
to Europe in the event of war. This became a prime aim of British policy from the start of 
1947 onwards, and dovetailed with developing concerns on the part of Bevin with regard to 
the security of Western Europe in the second half of 1947. 
 The perceived threat to Western Europe came from the actions of the USSR, which 
were considered increasingly menacing. While direct military action by the USSR could not 
be entirely ruled out, it was believed that it was following more indirect, though no less 
threatening, methods. The Soviet Government had rejected participation in Marshall Aid, 
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and had prevented the states in Eastern Europe that it controlled from doing so. Soviet 
policy was interpreted in Washington and London to be one of obstruction: of both 
European economic recovery and of the political settlement of issues outstanding from the 
Second World War, initially with regard to Germany. Soviet negotiators appeared to be 
deliberately procrastinating, and both Bevin and Marshall concluded before the London 
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in November 1947 that if this continued then there 
was no point in maintaining the appearance of cooperation and consultation. The Soviets, 
they thought, were stalling in the hopes of European economic collapse, which would 
enable domestic communist parties to seize power. Marshall therefore brought the London 
meeting to a premature close on 17 December, when it became clear that Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had not come with the intention of reaching agreement on 
any of the outstanding issues. This was to be the last of the regular scheduled meetings of 
the Council. 
The foundation of Cominform in September and a wave of communist-inspired 
industrial action in Western Europe convinced Bevin and Marshall that the Soviet aim was 
to undermine European economic recovery by subversion. Devastated, and socially and 
politically dislocated by the experiences of the war, European states were seen to be 
vulnerable to such tactics, and in need of an increased sense of security to give them the 
confidence to achieve economic recovery and to resist the propaganda of their own 
communists. The Western Europeans looked to Britain to provide reassurance, and this only 
intensified Britain’s own dilemma, as its defence strategy of ‘no continental commitment’ 
was not conducive to raising their spirits. Once again, a US commitment to participation in 
the defence of Western Europe appeared to provide the answer. These issues were the 
driving force for British initiatives following the collapse of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in December 1947, which led eventually to the formation of NATO.
16
 
At the start of January 1948, Bevin set out to his Cabinet colleagues a vision of a 
‘spiritual federation of the west,’ or ‘Western Union.’17 He followed this up with a speech 
to the House of Commons on 22 January. While the specifics of the proposal were unclear, 
the demonstration of initiative and leadership appealed to western Europeans, and their 
responses quickly built up a momentum that culminated in the conclusion of the Brussels 
Treaty on 17 March 1948, signed by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. The treaty promised mutual cooperation and commitment to each other’s 
defence. The USSR was not specifically named as the ostensible threat, though unlike the 
Anglo-French Dunkirk treaty of a year earlier, Germany was not defined as the potential 
enemy either.
18
 The treaty thus marked a vital stage in the movement away from alignments 
based on the Second World War. On 25 February 1948 communists in Czechoslovakia had 
engineered a coup, removing all pro-western elements from the Prague government. This 
had shaken the French in particular, and made them ready to take  bolder steps, as well as 
giving the opportunity for the increased political marginalisation of their own communists. 
The sense of insecurity in Western Europe that Bevin and Marshall had noted the previous 
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year, however, was naturally increased by the events in Czechoslovakia, a state which had 
seemed to straddle east and west. This accentuated the tendency of the continental European 
members of the Brussels pact to wish to address issues of defence immediately. 
 Bevin had always understood that what the newspapers called the ‘Bevin Plan’ had a 
defence dimension, but had sought from the moment that he unveiled his somewhat 
inchoate plan to Cabinet to cover this angle by getting a guarantee from the Americans that 
they would underwrite the defence of Western Europe.
19
 The Americans had resisted his 
attempts to get a firm public commitment, partly for domestic reasons, and partly because 
they saw the Bevin plan as a step towards the integration of Western Europe, which they 
regarded as the long-term solution to its economic and political problems. They wished to 
avoid any American participation that might harm this movement. Bevin, however, always 
considered a security guarantee from the US to be vital, both to provide Europeans with a 
sense of security, but also in order to prevent Britain from being drawn to commit its own 
scarce defence resources to a continental strategy.
20
 This became urgent for Britain because 
even before the Brussels Treaty was concluded, the Europeans had raised the issue of 
defence. The COS, however, had recently reaffirmed that they would not send any forces to 
defend Western Europe should it be attacked.
21
 The quest for an American commitment to 
do so became imperative as a consequence. 
 The communist seizure of power in Prague prompted Bevin to put the issue to the 
Americans again. On 25 and 26 February, immediately after the coup, he painted the 
situation in dramatic terms to United States Ambassador Lewis Douglas, saying that the 
next six to eight weeks would be crucial to the west.
22
 He stressed to Douglas that it was 
vital to have discussions on defence issues, involving France, Britain and the Benelux 
countries, and that they take place in Washington. Bevin received no direct response.
23
 On 3 
March he presented to Cabinet an alarmist paper outlining the dangers of the Soviet attempt 
to spread Communism.
24
 He remained convinced that the key to all the inter-connected 
problems of  European economic recovery, security against communist subversion such as 
had been deployed in Czechoslovakia and Britain’s own defence dilemma, was a US 
security commitment in a form more substantial than a presidential declaration. The 
problem facing the British was how to move the Americans to enter into such a 
commitment. The lack of response to Bevin’s pleas to Douglas showed that even the Czech 
coup, which had been a profound shock both sides of the Atlantic, was not sufficient to do 
this. A much less dramatic development, however, proved to be the trigger the British were 
looking for. 
Lange’s appeal to the West 
Late on March 8 1948, Halvard Lange informed Collier and the US ambassador, Ulrich 
Bay, that he had heard rumours from three sources that the Soviet Government was about to 
put pressure on Norway to agree a non-aggression pact. Lange said his government intended 
to refuse, but wished to know what support it could expect if Stalin responded in a hostile 
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fashion to this rebuff.
25
  The conventional narrative of the history of the foundation of 
NATO traces a direct line of causation from this point to the signature of the North Atlantic 
Treaty on April 4 1949.
26
   
 
 One of the notable aspects of the 8 March ‘crisis’ is that no panic is evident in either 
London or Washington. This has tended to be obscured by the language Bevin used to try 
and get action from Marshall: his phrase ‘imminent threat to Norway’ is often quoted: some 
narratives of NATO’s foundation even suggest that a Soviet invasion of Norway was 
expected.
27
 Yet the FO papers show no expectation of any Soviet movement against 
Norway. From the start the indefinite nature of what Lange had said to Collier was evident, 
and the rumours were quickly seen to be without foundation. The main issue was how to 
answer Lange, rather than deal with the Soviets. Moreover, the State Department appeared 
even less concerned: the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, reported from Washington 
that they did not initially seem to think Lange needed any answer at all.
28
  
 However, Bevin saw an opportunity to make progress on the larger issue of US 
commitment to European security, and asked Marshall for immediate talks on a security 
pact for the North Atlantic. His quest for an American security guarantee predated both 
Lange’s demarche and the Czech coup. It had been intended more as a precondition for 
movement to Western Union than as a consequence of it. The ‘North Atlantic’ angle was a 
new one, but otherwise in his plea to Marshall he was repeating earlier attempts to get the 
Americans to commit themselves to the defence of Western Europe.
29
 
Collier’s report also prompted an assessment of the place of Scandinavia in what 
was already being called the ‘cold war’. The significance of Lange’s queries was that they 
needed to be answered in such a way that Norwegian morale, and readiness to risk a hostile 
Soviet reaction, were not affected by the discouraging truth that neither power had plans to 
defend Norway. Similar unofficial requests made earlier by Defence Minister Jens Christian 
Hauge to service attachés had received only evasive answers: addressing them officially 
through ambassadors made it harder to pretend the questions had not been asked, especially 
with the hint of imminent Soviet demands added into the mix.
 30
 It was thus not Soviet 
pressure that was the impetus for action – there was no Soviet pressure – but concern that 
Norway should not lose its nerve. Thus it was that, although the reaction with regard to an 
external threat to Norway was indeed calm, other British documents – letters from Attlee to 
Commonwealth leaders and FO briefing for Bevin’s forthcoming discussions in Paris with 
                                                 
25
 Bay to Marshall 8 Mar., 9 Mar. 1948 Record Group 59, US National Archives, 857.20/3-848, /3-948; 
Collier to FO 104 8 Mar. 1948 FO371/71504/N2710 (despatched 10.23 pm). Lange went much further with 
Collier than with Bay, in specifically requesting what help Britain would provide if Norway was attacked as a 
result of refusing a Soviet demand for a non-aggression pact. 
26
 This is the account given on NATO’s own website, http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm, 
citing Lord Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years (Paris: NATO, 1955); Cook, Forging, 125; Riste, ‘Was 1949 a 
Turning Point?’, 139. 
27
 Richard Best, Cooperation With Like-Minded Peoples (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986), 163; Rolf 
Tamnes, ‘The Strategic Importance of the High North During the Cold War’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed), A 
History of NATO: The First Fifty Years (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) vol. 3, 258; Geir Lundestad,  America, 
Scandinavia and the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 178-81; Patrick Salmon, ‘Great 
Britain and Northern Europe from the Second World War to the Cold War’, in Robert Bohn and Jurgen Elvert 
(eds), Kriegsende im Norden. Vom Hießen zum Kalten Krieg (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 201. 
28
 Inverchapel to FO 10 March 1948 FO371/71504/N2912. 
29
 FO to Inverchapel 10 March 1948 FO371/71458/N3001; Inverchapel memo 11 March, Marshall to Truman 
and to Inverchapel 12 March 1948 FRUS1948: III, 46-9. 
30
 Collier to FO 15 Jan. 1948 FO371/71449/N637; Bay to Marshall 19 Feb. 1948 FRUS1948: III, 24ff; Collier 
despatch 8 March 1948 FO371/71450/N2775; Riste, ‘Was 1949 a Turning Point?’, 139. 
                                                                                                                9 
the Scandinavian foreign ministers – took a serious view of the situation.31 
 
Scandinavia in post-war British defence planning 
British planning after the end of the Second World War assumed that Norway was 
important for Britain’s own defence, for an enemy controlling Norway’s coastline could 
interdict Britain’s access to the Atlantic sea-lanes. Denmark was also seen as important 
because of its position at the entrance to the Baltic, its possession of Greenland, and close 
connections to Iceland. These latter territories were recognised to be of vital interest to the 
US as outliers of western hemisphere defence and as ‘stepping stones’ both in the provision 
of aid to Britain and in launching a strategic air offensive against the USSR. Sweden played 
a much less significant role in these direct strategic terms, but its position and policy were 
seen to be the keystone of the whole area. The problem was that while Norway and 
Denmark were regarded as strategically important, they were seen to be very weak. 
Moreover, with the tight fiscal constraints, the necessity for prioritisation meant that little, if 
any, force could be spared to help them. Thus, while Norwegian defence planning was 
based on an assumption that Britain would defend Norway, British planners had no 
intention of doing so.
32
 Closer contingency planning seemed vital (a lesson drawn from the 
experience of 1940), but would be counter-productive if it revealed this unpalatable fact to 
the Norwegians.
33
 
There was a way round this dilemma. Sweden was regarded as considerably 
stronger, and if the three states could collaborate, they would feel stronger and the very act 
of coordination might well deter the Soviets. Back in early 1947, this matter had been 
debated extensively in Whitehall and with the ambassadors at Oslo (Collier), Stockholm 
(Sir Bertrand Jerram) and Copenhagen (Alec Randall). Over the next two years, the British 
government contained within it a wide spectrum of opinions on this vital question. It would 
be misleading to imply, therefore, that Britain unambiguously and consistently sought to 
pull Norway and Denmark away from a Scandinavian pact and into NATO.
34
 Collier stood 
at one extreme, and occupied an influential position in Oslo throughout this period. At the 
other end were the COS, whose approach to Scandinavian coordination and neutrality was 
based on radically different premises. The FO Northern Department and other interested 
departments, the other ambassadors, and Bevin himself, moved between the two positions. 
This produced a policy kept fluid by the  conflicting imperatives of the British defence 
position right through to March 1949.  
Sir Laurence Collier was highly experienced in the matter of British relations with 
Scandinavia, having been head of the Northern Department for ten years before being 
appointed ambassador to the Norwegian government-in-exile in 1941. He had a record of 
voicing his views vigorously, even when they went against office wisdom.
35
 He had written 
on 19 December 1946 that it was better for British interests if Norway and Denmark did not 
get engaged in defence coordination with Sweden, for if they did so, they would catch the 
infection of appeasement, ‘Sweden’s usual policy towards her strongest neighbour.’ It 
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would be better, Collier argued, for the two countries to integrate their defences with those 
of Britain.
36
 This was to remain Collier’s firm view, and is the key to understanding his 
interpretation of Norwegian policy to Whitehall. Collier’s counterparts in Copenhagen and 
Stockholm disagreed. Randall favoured a Scandinavian defence pact, and Jerram, though 
more ambivalent on that, felt that Britain should encourage secret Scandinavian defence 
contacts.
 Norway’s ‘sturdy courage’ might stiffen the Swedes.37  
FO officials agreed it might be best to encourage the three to strengthen their 
defences by working together. Suspecting that Collier harboured anti-Swedish prejudices 
that distorted his judgement, they doubted whether Sweden would appease the USSR to the 
same degree that it did Germany: Russia was its traditional enemy.
38
  
From the military point of view in 1947, a Scandinavian defence bloc seemed to 
serve British strategic interests – and from this the COS were not to waver over the next two 
years. The Joint Planning Staff (JPS) view was that unfortunately the Scandinavians would 
be reluctant to form such a bloc, through fear of Soviet responses, unless given guarantees 
of military assistance from the western powers.
39
 Similarly, Randall warned that any 
pressure from Britain to develop a defence bloc would produce a demand to know what 
Britain and the US would do to assist it in the event of a Soviet reaction.
40
 British lack of 
resources, and US resistance to making commitments of this sort, meant it was best to 
prevent such questions being asked, for the discouraging answers would make the situation 
worse. 
Clandestine contacts developed between individual Scandinavian officers, but 
without official government sanction.
41
 The Danes were most enthusiastic for Scandinavian 
cooperation, believing that Denmark would be an early target if the USSR embarked on 
aggression in Europe.
42
 Norway shared much of this feeling of vulnerability, but antipathy 
to Sweden, and the experience of the Second World War, inclined them to prefer defence 
cooperation with the west, if Britain and the United States were prepared to offer the 
necessary guarantees. Neither, at the end of 1947 was yet prepared to do so, despite their 
recognition of Norway’s strategic significance.  
There were two potential dangers inherent in this situation in British minds at the 
start of 1948. One was the possibility stressed by Collier that Sweden would lead  
Scandinavia into neutrality, rendering any prior planning impossible. A second was the 
internal political position in the three countries. These considerations were evident in 
British actions after 8 March. They were not contingent on there being any substance to the 
rumours of imminent Soviet demands. More important was that the Norwegians might 
believe them true. They had to be reassured – and Lange’s specific questions about military 
assistance determined what kind of form that reassurance needed to take. The Norwegian 
government also, it was believed, needed to be prompted not to lose sight of the main 
danger: they must not become obsessed with unlikely Soviet military moves, when the real 
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danger, as the communist actions in Czechoslovakia seemed to show, was internal. Covert 
intelligence reports from Norway suggested that communist activity in factories, 
organization for sabotage and caches of weapons formerly belonging to the resistance, were 
far greater than the authorities seemed to realise, even though Prime Minister Einar 
Gerhardsen had made a fierce speech on 29 February in the wake of the Czech coup calling 
attention to a domestic communist threat.
43
 The speech apparently failed to satisfy Bevin, 
for he continued to emphasise this issue, minuting ‘my information is that… the Communist 
movement in Scandinavia is better organised than we realise.’ When he met Lange in Paris 
on 15 March, he moved on from assuring him that Britain and the US were soon to meet to 
discuss Atlantic security, to deliver a homily about the need to clamp down on subversives. 
Indeed, Bevin declared Britain itself was implementing a discreet witch-hunt and he urged 
Lange to ensure his government did the same. Of course, this was a way of diverting Lange 
away from awkward questions about what would be done to aid Norwegian defence. But 
this was a genuine concern of Bevin’s, and one on which he felt, from his own trade union 
experience, uniquely qualified to give advice.
44
 
The British soon discounted the rumours, but pressed the Americans for discussions 
on the organisation of not only North Atlantic, but also West European, and Mediterranean 
security. This clearly had little to do with the need to act quickly to save Norway from 
Soviet assault. The threat to Norway in British eyes came internally, not externally.
45
 The 
further danger was that Lange’s questions could expose British intention not to act to defend 
Norway.  Marshall’s positive response to Bevin’s plea led to top secret Anglo-American-
Canadian talks in the Pentagon at the end of March. They resulted in a paper recommending 
the formation of a North Atlantic security group – but the American delegates insisted this 
remain absolutely secret and that the paper should be regarded merely as a State Department 
working paper. As it happened, considerable debate on the issue was to follow within the 
US administration. The absence of a public agreement meant there was nothing from the 
Pentagon talks that could serve the purpose of boosting Norwegian confidence, when Lange 
had been led to expect something helpful from the consultations. Norway had long been 
interested in defence coordination with Britain, and Lange was trailing the idea of a 
‘Northern Defence Union’  involving Britain, in March and April 1948. He received no 
encouragement from Britain on this either.
46
 Instead, the Norwegian government became 
drawn into discussions on inter-Scandinavian coordination.
47
 
The absence of a real US movement towards the early conclusion of an Atlantic pact 
meant that the British for their part were drawn to consider how to ensure that the 
Scandinavians worked together to improve their own sense of security, while not adopting 
Sweden’s isolationist neutrality.48 The US Ambassador to Sweden, Freeman Matthews, 
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was, like Collier in Oslo, a fierce critic of Swedish neutrality, and he urged the State 
Department to put pressure on Sweden to come over fully into the western camp.
49
 The US 
counsellor in Stockholm, Hugh Smith Cumming, told startled Swedish businessmen that in 
the event of a war Swedish factories would be bombed out of existence to deny them to the 
Soviets.
50
 The British did not like to apply such direct pressure, preferring to influence 
Scandinavian policy by what Robin Hankey, the head of the FO Northern Department, 
called ‘crafty diplomacy’, but which, in the following nine months was actually over-
complicated and predominantly reactive.
51
 It was, moreover, hamstrung by American 
inaction. Despite the events in Czechoslovakia and Lange’s anxious pleas, there was little 
public sign of urgency coming from Washington regarding the organization of North 
Atlantic security. Although Bevin’s agitated predictions in March had proved unfounded, 
the British were not happy with such leisurely progress. The problem was not the prospect 
of further action by the USSR, but by Sweden.
52
  
 
Exploration of the option of a Scandinavian regional solution 
The matter was immediate because of what Hankey called a ‘new and more aggressive 
formulation of Swedish neutrality.’53 Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén was 
concerned that Norway was moving towards too definite an alignment with the western 
powers. Across the region there was considerable attachment to the idea of 
Scandinavianism. The Swedish government capitalised on these feelings, knowing that 
politicians in the other two countries would find it inadvisable to be appearing to stand in 
the way of increasing inter-Scandinavian cooperation. Gerhardsen was inclined to respond 
positively, and Lange himself saw some merits in Scandinavian defence cooperation.
54
 At 
the meeting of Scandinavian prime ministers in Stockholm on 9-10 May, Undén gained 
agreement from Gerhardsen and Hans Hedtoft, Prime Minister of Denmark, to a 
memorandum affirming that a Scandinavian Defence Union should be considered. It would 
keep outside any other grouping and avoid involvement in a war between great powers.
55
 
The Swedish proposal was disturbing to those Norwegians who looked for more explicit 
military planning with Britain. These included Lange, Hauge and the influential Haakon 
Lie, secretary of the Norwegian Labour party.
56
 They had close links in Whitehall – Hauge 
had worked with the Special Operations Executive during the war – and had been 
encouraged by Collier. The Norwegian defence establishment regarded the Swedes with 
animosity, with bitter memories of Swedish cooperation with Germany during the 
occupation of Norway from 1940 to 1945. Lange and Hauge threatened to resign when 
Gerhardsen returned to Oslo, and he accordingly withdrew Norwegian agreement to the 
Stockholm memorandum on 14 May. The Swedish initiative, however, had attracted many 
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Norwegian socialists, deeply distrustful of the United States, and appealed to a wide cross-
section of the public that was attached to the ideals of Scandinavianism. The Danes were 
anxious to forge Scandinavian cooperation, fearful that immediate help in the event of a war 
could only come from Sweden, not from the west, and in September, Hedtoft succeeded in 
getting agreement to set up a Scandinavian Defence Committee to study the issues.
57
 
The Swedish perspective was explained on 20 May by Ambassador Erik Boheman 
to Sir Orme Sargent, the permanent under-secretary at the FO. Boheman said that if the 
Soviets thought their enemies would not make use of Scandinavia as a base, they would 
leave it alone. The western powers could not do anything for Scandinavia if it came to the 
point of war, but Scandinavia could organise its own defence and offer serious resistance to 
the Soviets.
58
 The Swedish belief that they had a policy that was acceptable to both east and 
west was derided in the FO as  unrealistic, and it was felt, as Harold Farquhar, the new 
ambassador in Stockholm, remarked, ‘a cold douche for their complacency is … sadly 
required.’59 However, the FO still rejected putting any pressure on Sweden, and continued 
to believe the key to progress could only come from Washington. Instead of pressing 
Sweden, the situation was used once more to urge action from the Americans. Bevin warned 
Marshall on 1 June,  ‘we must … keep in mind the danger that a ‘neutral’ Scandinavian 
system will develop if the question of mutual support as between Western Europe and the 
United States is left in the doldrums.’ 60 
Progress on the idea of a North Atlantic pact had indeed stalled while the Pentagon 
paper was further debated within the State Department. Behind the scenes, advocates of an 
alliance set out  to convince key congressional figures. Most important was leading 
Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. In an election year, support from both parties was necessary if such a big 
departure from American tradition was to be achieved.  However, until this process 
produced results, Collier reported that the absence of a statement of what support they could 
expect was making it hard for Lange and Hauge to hold Norway’s position, let alone 
prevent Denmark’s inclination to Scandinavianism setting up a momentum in public 
opinion that would draw them both towards the Swedish solution.
61
 Marshall acknowledged 
the situation, but rather lamely stated that since the US role was ‘not yet crystallized,’ it was 
difficult for the US to influence the Scandinavians. Matthews’ heavy-handed attempts to 
dissuade the Swedes from neutrality by threatening the withholding of supplies, were 
stopped. The Americans thus at this point effectively had no Scandinavian policy.
62
 This 
left the British to attempt to finesse the matter as best they could in the absence of the only 
condition they thought would make a decisive difference. 
 
The ‘Hankey Plan’ 
To deal with this situation, Robin Hankey fleshed out an idea that had been current in his 
department for a while. The plan involved Norwegian and Danish membership of a North 
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Atlantic pact, simultaneous with their membership of a defence union with Sweden. The 
three Scandinavian countries would be bound by pledges of mutual assistance in time of 
attack, joint planning and standardisation of arms, but Sweden would only be required to 
take action if Norway or Denmark were themselves attacked, remaining neutral if they went 
to war as a result of their obligations to other North Atlantic pact members. It was necessary 
to recognise, Hankey told Frances Willis of the US embassy, that the attachment of the 
Scandinavian powers to any Western Union or Atlantic Union would have to be allowed to 
shade off gradually as one got further eastwards.
63
 This idea of graded membership of the 
alliance had some appeal, for otherwise those outside the bloc might be regarded by the 
Soviets as of no interest to the western powers. Under a scheme such as this a hard division 
of Europe would be avoided. It would be useful in accommodating states like Greece, 
Turkey, Austria, and maybe Finland and Yugoslavia as well – advocates of this approach, 
who included, in a slightly different form, George Kennan in the State Department, hoped 
that by not formalising the blocs too rigidly, some states that were within the Soviet orbit 
might be drawn away from it in time, notably Finland.
 64
  
This approach, Hankey hoped, would be less likely to provoke the Soviets to tighten 
up their control of the intermediate areas, such as Finland, than would a direct alliance of 
Sweden with the Atlantic pact. It would give Norway and Denmark all they would really 
need from Sweden. It would assuage Sweden’s fears that the Soviets would push for bases 
in western Finland, were it to align with the US, while at the same time preventing a 
Swedish lapse into full isolation.
65
 The plan was drawn up in order to be able to influence 
the Scandinavian discussions in the direction the British preferred, though the FO never 
came to a decision as to the opportune moment to put it forward. It became the subject of 
rumour and of unofficial debate with the State Department and the Norwegians.
66
 It also, 
however, came to serve a different purpose within the British government’s own debate, 
offering a compromise between the diplomats and the military, as we will see. 
 In the United States, the discussions with Vandenberg had borne fruit. The senator 
sponsored Senate Resolution 239, affirming support for US membership of a regional 
security pact in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The resolution 
was approved by the Senate on 11 July, a process undoubtedly aided by the Soviet closure 
of western access to Berlin on 24 June, precipitating a crisis that lasted until May 1949. The 
Vandenberg Resolution freed the hands of the administration to enter negotiations, and 
these began in Washington, involving the ambassadors of Canada and the five Brussels 
treaty powers, together with Robert Lovett, under-secretary of state. Initial progress was 
slow, as the Americans did not in any way regard themselves as bound by the Pentagon 
paper, and the North Atlantic concept was a new one to all the Europeans, except the 
British. France and Belgium disliked it on the grounds that it threatened to draw resources 
to the flanks. They feared that Norway, Iceland and Greenland might prove of more interest 
to the US than the defence of the Rhine.
67
 Real progress was made only when a smaller 
working group was set up, helped by the crisis atmosphere and sense of urgency engendered 
by the continuing Soviet blockade of Berlin. After meeting throughout August, an updated 
                                                 
63
 Hankey to Farquhar 9 Aug. 1948 FO371/71725/N8874.  
64
 Alan K. Henrikson, ‘The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1952’, Naval War College Review 
xxxii (May-June 1980), 20; Vaernø, ‘Norway’, 19. 
65
 Hankey minute 23 July 1948 on telegram from Scott (Helsinki) FO371/71725/N8293; Hankey paper 6 Aug. 
1948 FO371/71458/N8874. 
66
 Meeting of ambassadors and Bateman minute 22 Oct., Hankey to Randall 22 Nov., Hickerson to Hoyer 
Millar 15 Nov. 1948 FO371/71454/N11864, N11090, N12412, N12618; Collier despatch 20 Oct. 1948 
FO337/119; Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia’, 261; Petersen, ‘Alliance Policies’, 207. 
67
 Foreign Ministers meeting 20 July 1948 PREM8/1431. 
                                                                                                                15 
proposal for a North Atlantic pact was produced at the start of September for governments 
to consider.
68
  
The FO lectured its European allies that Norway and Denmark were of cardinal 
importance, for a war might begin there, as it had before. They should therefore be included 
in the pact.
69
 However, this was not a unanimous view in the British government. Rather 
than following the FO’s lead, the COS now reiterated their different perspective on the 
issue. Although the defence aspects of the North Atlantic pact idea were in essence long-
term, short-term military issues could not be kept out of the reckoning, for if the prime aim 
of a boost to confidence and sense of security was to be achieved, the Europeans needed 
their present anxieties about their strategic weakness assuaged.
70
 As we have seen, the very 
act of beginning the process of cooperation had brought forth such questions: although the 
British (and Americans) regarded them as untimely, the fact they had been posed meant the 
issue was hard to ignore. Moreover, the crisis over Berlin, which carried the real possibility 
that war would break out over the Anglo-American efforts to break the Soviet blockade of 
the city by air, meant that these immediate issues loomed large in British military minds as 
well. On 28 July, Montgomery reaffirmed that it was out of the question that Britain would 
give any land assistance to Norway in event of war.
71
 
 
‘A Necessary Adjunct’ 
However, for all the sense of crisis engendered by the confrontation over Berlin, the period 
from September 1948 to January 1949 saw little decisive movement towards completion of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. The working group had worked well, and produced a draft of a 
treaty, in which two levels of membership were proposed, on 9 September. Norway, 
Iceland, Denmark and Sweden were seen to be appropriate members, though it was unclear 
whether their membership should be full or limited. There then followed a long pause. 
Berlin tended to focus attention on immediate issues: plans for the future seemed less 
germane when it seemed possible that, in the words of the COS, they would have to ‘fight 
with what we’ve got.’72 The Brussels Treaty powers considered the draft treaty in a 
leisurely fashion, and only in December produced instructions and a revised draft for their 
ambassadors to put forward in Washington. In the United States, the general election meant 
no progress was possible until November. After President Harry Truman won his surprise 
re-election (and the Democrats regained control of the Senate), the State Department was 
eager to move forward, but it was only on 24 December that the working group reported an 
updated version of the treaty.  
 This slow – or non-existent - progress meant that the Scandinavian discussions 
continued without outside pressure to reach a speedy conclusion. Indeed, even when the 
State Department voiced a readiness to address the issue of Scandinavian membership, the 
British held them back, preferring to see whether the talks could indeed produce a 
compromise conclusion akin to the Hankey scenario. Scandinavian scholars have debated 
the degree to which Norwegian participation in these talks was whole-hearted, or whether 
they persisted simply to give the impression to their public opinion that they had tried, while 
behind the scenes Lange worked to ensure the talks failed. British policy is portrayed as 
allowing the talks to ‘blow themselves out’, in Nicholas Henderson’s words, while ensuring 
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the State Department did not impede this process by crudely applied pressure that might 
prove counter-productive by seeming to be outside interference.
73
 A detailed look at the 
British record, however, shows that during this three month hiatus period, the British view 
of the place of Norway and Denmark in a North Atlantic pact was the subject of 
considerable internal debate. With their minds focused by the Berlin crisis and the 
inadequacy of Britain’s armed forces if it came to war, the British military reiterated their 
support for a Scandinavian defence pact, and threw the FO’s assumptions into doubt. As a 
consequence, they watched the Scandinavian talks with some hopes that a suitable solution 
might emerge close to the lines of Hankey’s scenario, and did not simply await their 
collapse with equanimity. 
On 8 September the COS considered a report Short Term Strategic Aims in Europe 
at the Outbreak of War, which recognised that the territorial integrity of Scandinavia was 
important to the air defence of Great Britain and to allied shipping, but concluded its 
defence was not as important as that of France and Benelux. The best that could be hoped 
for was that Scandinavia stay neutral and be prepared to defend itself if attacked.
74
 On 10 
September the vice-chiefs (VCOS) endorsed Hankey’s plan, but emphasised that the COS 
would not contemplate giving any armed assistance to the Scandinavians. There was also 
some risk that Norway and Denmark would look to Britain for equipment they ought to get 
from Sweden.
75
  
 Military misgivings about the possible undertakings that would have to be made to 
Norway and Denmark if they were in an Atlantic pact while Sweden was not, became more 
evident over the next four months. A War Office note on the working group’s draft Atlantic 
Pact proposal reiterated that Britain should not be committed to war in defence of countries 
whose loss would not put it in mortal danger, nor disperse its forces to areas that were not 
vital. Scandinavia was not in that category, though Iceland was. Britain should proceed by 
bluffing and secret diplomacy, not public pacts. Norway and Denmark were unlikely in any 
event to join any pact that did not offer direct military assistance.
76
 
British policy-makers needed to resolve these conflicting aims and assumptions. 
Hankey summarised the dilemma: either Norway, abetted by Britain, bring Sweden to agree 
to a Scandinavian pact associated with the Atlantic pact, or Norway, in order to have any 
security, would require armed assistance from the west on a scale impossible to provide. 
‘There seems no doubt’, he told Sargent, ‘a Scandinavian Pact is a necessary adjunct to 
association of Norway and Denmark with the Atlantic Pact.’77 Following a conference with 
the three British ambassadors on 22 October, Hankey despairingly noted that Britain could 
not avoid telling the Scandinavians what would be offered them if they joined the Atlantic 
pact – that is, giving the direct, frank answer to the question Lange posed on 8 March, 
which had consistently been avoided until then. But if this information did not make them 
feel secure, as it probably would not, they would remain neutral and appease the Soviets.
78
  
 The JPS and COS remained sure that Scandinavia was indefensible without a 
regional defence pact, though also holding that Swedish self-confidence was misplaced and 
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that the pact would need some outside help.
79
 They felt the Norwegians needed to be aware 
of the importance of defence cooperation with Sweden. Entry on their own into a North 
Atlantic pact would expose to them the inability of Britain to come directly to their aid in 
the event of war, and also reveal the main American interests in the region, which were their 
mid-Atlantic territories, over-fly rights to attack the USSR and denial of resources to the 
enemy. Alliance with Sweden would cover the issue of the defence of the mainland, thereby 
rendering these uncomfortable facts secondary, so that they would not impede the 
development of a Norwegian sense of security – and therefore firmness against internal 
subversion.   
The COS continued to seek alternatives to Norway and Denmark being members of 
the Atlantic pact without Sweden. They asserted that a Scandinavian pact was of great 
strategic importance.
80
 The JPS concluded that a communist-dominated Scandinavia would 
not place the British Commonwealth in mortal danger. But certain strategic facilities made 
the region important in a war with the USSR, and these at least would need to be denied to 
the enemy. However, viewed from a military point of view, the FO’s gloomy view of the 
potential of a neutral Scandinavian pact was misplaced. The JPS argued that if the three 
countries followed a co-ordinated defence policy, they could be a valuable strategic asset, 
for it would give them the ability to defend themselves. By contrast, the security offered to 
them by a North Atlantic pact was principally its deterrent influence on the Soviets. The 
British military saw Norway and Denmark as such a liability that they were in favour of it 
even if Sweden insisted it was to be neutral and unconnected to the North Atlantic 
arrangement. As far as the COS were concerned, it was best ‘to keep the cold war out of 
Scandinavia.’81 
In response to this, Hankey argued that Scandinavian neutrality would not be 
respected by either side in a life-and-death struggle since it was on the bomber route to the 
USSR. The Soviets would only be deterred by strength.
82
 The COS stuck to their guns, 
however, noting on 3 January 1949 that it would not be wise to include Norway and 
Denmark in the North Atlantic pact without Sweden. Scandinavian defence should be 
treated as a whole. It is often claimed that the British fallback position should the Hankey 
plan fail was Norwegian and Danish membership of the Atlantic Pact, but as far as the COS 
were concerned the preferred alternative was a Scandinavian Defence Union.
83
 They were 
probably strengthened in this view by the knowledge (from leaks) that the Swedish General 
Staff was opposed to its government’s policy of neutrality.84 
 
Talks resume in Washington – and end in Scandinavia. 
The Washington talks  resumed in January 1949. Once again, the small working group 
functioned effectively and made good progress in gaining a consensus on the outstanding 
issues. However, the US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, found when he reviewed the 
state of negotiations, that much preparatory work needed to be done with congressmen. The 
consensus informally reached in the working group could not, therefore be regarded as 
settled at least until it was clear that it would be accepted in the Senate. In a sense, 
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therefore, at the end of January 1949, when Acheson began concerted work on this, the 
negotiations became more fluid. At the same time, the inter-state negotiations moved up to 
the ambassadorial level where they tended to be more contentious. The states involved 
attempted, on what would be last opportunity, to press their particular concerns, such as the 
French determination to secure the inclusion of the Algerian departments in the area 
covered by the Treaty.
85
 Despite the time it had taken since the process had begun in the 
wake of Lange’s comments to Bay and Collier in March 1948, and the continuing crisis 
over Berlin, much still needed to be thrashed out and agreed by European governments and 
American senators, as opposed to their representatives in the supportive and congenial 
atmosphere of the working group. Fundamental questions, such as who should be members 
of the pact, and when and on what basis they should join, took another six weeks to 
resolve.
86
 The British ambassador at Washington, Oliver Franks, who had a close working 
relationship with Acheson and was most sensitive to what senators would and would not 
accept, played a key role in mediating these issues, but back in Whitehall, while there was 
an acceptance of the need for pragmatic compromises, because of their enthusiasm for a 
North Atlantic pact, the continuing imperatives of their defence dilemma meant these were 
not just issues to be overlooked in the interest of concluding some form of pact. The same 
considerations as before continued to play a role in producing a continuing uncertainty 
regarding Scandinavian membership. Laurence Collier played a key role in determining the 
outcome of the internal British debate in favour of Norwegian membership. 
The issue of Scandinavian participation came to a head when Sweden produced a 
definite proposal of a Scandinavian alliance at a meeting in Karlstad on 6 January, which 
Norway provisionally accepted.
87
 Undén was convinced that Scandinavia could keep out of 
a European conflict if their bloc was both neutral and strong – though in fact the Soviets 
assumed any Scandinavian bloc would be pro-western.
88
 He feared that Soviet action in 
Finland would be provoked were allied bases to be allowed on Scandinavian territory. He 
refused therefore to entertain a compromise by which a neutrality provision would only 
include the mainland, excluding the island territories, such as the Faeroes and Greenland. 
Although the Swedish General Staff themselves had misgivings, these attitudes had 
considerable support in Denmark. The Danes were conscious of their vulnerability, whether 
an attack was launched in Scandinavia or in Central Europe. Denmark and Sweden, Foreign 
Minister Gustav Rasmussen told Randall, were concerned that the west would do nothing if 
they were overrun, and that membership of the Atlantic pact would provoke the Soviets. A 
Swedish guarantee and supply of armaments was valued greatly.
89
 In the FO it was 
commented that the Danes had ‘wobbled off the fence on the Swedish side.’90 
Even after all these months, however, British policy in response was deeply 
ambiguous. Hankey complained to Gunnar Hägglöff, the new Swedish ambassador, that it 
was only the Swedes who thought that a Scandinavian bloc and association with the west 
were mutually exclusive – he was clearly still hopeful of a ‘grading off eastwards’ 
solution.
91
 If only the pact was itself not neutral, that would serve Britain’s needs, Hankey 
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noted, as they did not need much from Norway and Denmark, and without Sweden they 
were a considerable liability. He therefore proposed a second plan, in which Norway and 
Denmark would not actually be in the North Atlantic pact, but would make arrangements 
with the US and Britain regarding the Faeroes and Greenland. In return for joint planning, 
all three states would receive supplies. The potential drawback was that under Swedish 
leadership they might be drawn into semi-isolation and drift into a ‘passive and weak-kneed 
policy’ towards the Soviet Union.92  
Collier’s interpretation of the Karlstad meeting was that Denmark hoped for such an 
arrangement, and believed that Washington could be persuaded to alter the US policy to 
provide no arms to nations that did not have reciprocal arrangements with them. Norway 
went along with this to satisfy its own isolationists. Scandinavian public opinion, Collier 
reported, was impressed by the Swedish offer. This was all in line with Collier’s oft-
repeated warnings that Sweden would draw Norway away from the west if it could.
93
 To 
Collier, as he had been arguing since December 1946, the central fact to build on was a 
Norwegian willingness to join the western powers: that, he said, was the only firm 
foundation. As before, Collier disregarded military misgivings that Norway on its own 
would be a liability. If Britain ‘held on to the substance rather than the shadow’ then the 
Danes might be drawn back away from the Swedes, and Sweden perhaps would come to 
realise the disadvantages of isolation. Hankey appreciated Collier’s viewpoint but still 
preferred a system of interlocking arrangements, if possible, though he conceded that 
Iceland would follow Norway and Denmark and it was very important to have Iceland in 
the Atlantic pact.
94
 
Hankey therefore outlined his plan once again, revised a little to embrace the new 
realities in Scandinavia. If adopted, it would have set a sturdy precedent for the relationship 
of NATO to the states on its periphery, and created a zone of gradation between the eastern 
and western blocs. On 17 January, he recommended that Norway and Denmark indeed be 
included in the Atlantic Pact, with the proposed Swedish guarantee to them only becoming 
operative if they themselves were attacked. He saw two possible alternatives to this. One 
was that Norway and Denmark should be in the Atlantic pact, with no connection to a 
neutralist Sweden. Second, there was the option that emerged from Karlstad: a 
Scandinavian pact, with Norway and Denmark unable to join the Atlantic pact, but making 
certain arrangements with Britain and the US.
95
 Gladwyn Jebb, one of the keenest of the FO 
officials for an Atlantic pact, agreed that it would be rash to ignore Sweden, for it was not 
possible to give Norway and Denmark what they needed to secure their own defence. He 
recommended the Karlstad option. Sargent, who had said little in this debate, although he 
was the senior official in the FO, now intervened and ruled that this option was not to be 
pursued. He preferred Norway and Denmark’s membership in the Atlantic pact, with 
Sweden isolated.
96
 However, Foreign Office minister Hector McNeil was briefed that the 
aim was to get Norwegian and Danish membership of the Atlantic pact by inducing the 
Swedes to drop the requirement that they would have to be neutral in order to be in a 
Scandinavian pact, so the link with Sweden was still a goal, and seemed a possibility, given 
the views of the Swedish General Staff. Bevin, however, ruled that this all needed careful 
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consideration before taking it any further, with the practicalities of arms supplies much in 
his mind.
97
 
While the diplomatists dithered, the COS held to their line. They continued to favour 
a separate neutral bloc if it was not possible to include all three in the Atlantic pact. Their 
previous endorsement of the Hankey plan was, they said, given on the assumption that it 
would be possible to associate Sweden with the Atlantic pact. For them, the primary aim 
was that all three should stand together, so Collier’s enthusiasm for separating Norway from 
Sweden was entirely misplaced. If they acted together, they would form ‘quite a formidable 
military combination.’ Underlying these assertions, however, was the view of the COS that 
these three countries, while important, were not absolutely vital to Britain’s survival, and 
that therefore any commitment which would involve the use of already inadequate British 
resources could not be justified on military grounds. They did add that it would be 
‘embarrassing’ if the neutral bloc extended to cover the Faeroes and Iceland.98 
British ambiguity was on the verge of being resolved in favour of this weighty and 
decisive pronouncement. Hankey drafted instructions to Franks, saying that Norway and 
Denmark without Sweden would be a strategic liability: the forces required to defend them, 
without help from Sweden, would not be available for many years. Rather than try to draw 
Norway and Denmark into the Atlantic pact, driving Sweden into isolation, Britain should 
build on the Karlstad proposal, focusing on trying to move Sweden from its insistence that 
Norway and Denmark cut themselves off from the west.
99
  
 
Collier intervenes again 
Collier, however, was as firm in his views as the COS. Before the message to Franks could 
be sent, he weighed in again. Collier was determined to achieve Norwegian membership of 
the western alliance, and not only was he prepared to accept Norwegian separation from 
Sweden, he positively welcomed it. He condemned the Hankey plan, claiming (correctly) 
that Norwegian opinion would not accept any Scandinavian pact that involved Norway in 
obligations not shared by Sweden, for under the plan Norway would have to help the 
western powers, while Sweden would not. Collier felt that Hauge suspected the plan was a 
result of British belief that Norway was a liability. If Norway stayed out, Collier warned, it 
would fall into the Swedish orbit, Lange might have to resign, and ‘our name would be 
mud.’100   
Collier’s trump card was his claim that the Norwegians were determined to enter the 
Atlantic pact without an arrangement with Sweden. Weight of opinion shifted from the COS 
view to that of Collier. The instructions to Franks were dropped and instead Hankey was 
told to draft a Cabinet paper, favouring the entry of Norway and Denmark into the Atlantic 
pact over Scandinavian neutrality. Swedish ‘obstinacy’ was blamed for the imminent 
breakdown of the Scandinavian defence talks. Collier argued that a Norwegian decision in 
favour of the Atlantic pact would be confused by further mention of interlocking pacts, so it 
was decided not to approach them at all with regard to the need for help from Sweden. 
Hankey returned to the argument that Sweden might lead them into appeasement, and, 
rather illogically, speculated that Sweden might feel isolated when Norway and Denmark 
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joined the Atlantic pact, and seek to make defence arrangements anyway.
101
 British 
reservations remained, however, for Hankey’s immediate superior, Charles Bateman, 
amended the paper to indicate that it was hoped Norway and Denmark would come in when 
the ‘opportunity arrives,’ since it was clear that if an approach was made to them now, they 
would immediately ask for a statement of what would be given to them, and a reply would 
be extremely disappointing. British policy was still performing a frenzied dance around this 
issue.
102
  
British policy was not yet settled, however. On 27 January all three service chiefs 
reaffirmed strongly that they favoured Scandinavian neutrality. The only condition was that 
Iceland would not be included.
103
 They averred that if the Scandinavians united to deny the 
region to an enemy, they stood a reasonable chance of success, given help in peacetime and 
provided the Soviets were also fighting on the Rhine. It was conceded that even with a 
neutral Scandinavian pact, Britain and the US would have to provide supplies, and would 
want to use Greenland and the Faeroes, which would give the Soviets a casus belli against 
the Scandinavians. However, in purely military terms, the judgement of the JPS, endorsed 
by the COS, was that a neutral pact was preferable to having Norway and Denmark in the 
Atlantic arrangement, unconnected to Sweden: the latter would mean that Britain would 
have to give them arms ‘at the expense of our main strategic aims’ – and in any case, 
successful Scandinavian defence, as earlier studies had established, depended on all three 
states cooperating. They disliked the option of bringing Norway and Denmark into the 
Atlantic pact as a first step, in the hopes that Sweden would feel isolated and follow.
104
 
 
Response to further Soviet intervention 
It was ostensibly an ill-judged Soviet action that moved this issue to resolution. On 29 
January the USSR sent a note to the Norwegian government, pressuring it not to join an 
Atlantic pact. Far from deterring the Norwegians, this enabled Lange to seize the initiative 
in a manner reminiscent of March 1948.
105
 He indicated that an invitation to the 
Washington talks would be well-received. However, this was actually as much a 
consequence of the final breakdown of the Scandinavian talks as it was of Soviet pressure – 
two abortive meetings in Copenhagen (22-24 January) and Oslo (29-30 January) failed to 
remove Norwegian misgivings that the link to the west allowed in the Karlstad formula was 
too narrow. It offered no certainty that the west would help Scandinavian defence, and the 
Swedish assumption (and Danish hope) that US arms supplies would still be available to a 
neutral bloc went against what Lange believed was American policy. Lange had already 
indicated to the Norwegian public on 27 January that the North Atlantic pact option was 
being considered: that is, before the issue of the Soviet note.
106
  Lange then made a high-
profile visit to Washington: though while there all he did was ask Acheson whether the 
Americans preferred Norway in an Atlantic or in a Scandinavian arrangement – and if the 
latter, what the position would be regarding the supply of munitions. All this achieved was 
to reopen the issue, as Acheson then sought the views of the other negotiating powers.
107
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 The FO did not believe the Soviets would follow their note with hostilities, but 
concluded that Denmark and Norway would be less vulnerable to such pressure if they 
joined the talks. Franks therefore supported their membership of the pact in the 
ambassadorial meeting on 8 February.
108
 Characteristically, a further reaction to the Soviet 
note was concern that Norway should keep an eye on its own communists.
109
 The COS 
acknowledged that the Soviet pressure changed matters: they were prepared to accept that 
the Scandinavian question was now ‘part of the cold war.’ Tedder reiterated, even at this 
juncture, their preference for a neutral Scandinavian pact, but he conceded that the military 
balance between the options was narrow and political considerations might now tip the 
balance the other way.
110
 
 However, the issue of whether Norway should be included in the talks and whether 
it and other prospective members from outside Western Union should be founder-members 
remained contentious issues in the final stage of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
in Washington in February and March 1949. British attitudes performed another flip. On 14 
February, when Lange passed through London on his way home from Washington, Bevin 
tried earnestly to persuade him not to press for immediate participation in the talks or 
indeed membership of the pact.
111
 Apart from the long-standing obsession that British plans 
not to fight in Norway must not be known to the Norwegians, the fear now was that the 
small powers would raise issues that would delay matters, thereby exercising influence out 
of proportion to their strength and status. The role the British had in mind for them was as 
shelterers under the Anglo-American security umbrella, which they should accept in 
whatever terms were offered. This is evident explicitly with reference to Italy, when the 
British a number of times expressed the view that the Italians would ‘bedevil the 
discussions’ by raising unwelcome issues and setting conditions for their membership.112 
They were less negative about the Norwegians, but the underlying concern was the same. 
Moreover, having the smaller powers accede after the treaty was signed would mean that 
the initial defence discussions under the treaty would take place without them. This would 
meet a crucial British requirement: to avoid the pact drawing Britain into extra defence 
commitments. It would also keep the nature of the short-term strategy devised in the context 
of the Berlin crisis from the smaller powers – that is, that some of them would be sacrificed 
in strategic retreats.
113
 
 Lange was not prepared to go along with this British proposal, and may well have 
been encouraged by Collier, who, blithely regardless of fluctuating views in Whitehall, 
continued to press for Norway’s early inclusion in the talks themselves.114 A direct request 
by the Norwegian ambassador at Washington, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, to join the 
discussions, despite Bevin’s proposal to Lange, made it impossible to refuse. On 25 
February, Acheson proposed to the ambassadors that Norway be invited, in response to 
                                                                                                                                                     
it, prompting enquiries back to the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty, 12th Washington meeting 8 
February 1949 FO800/455.  
108
 FO to Franks 1 Feb. 1949 FO371/77397/N1015; Brief for Bevin 3 Feb. 1949 FO371/77394/N1472; 12th 
Washington meeting 8 February 1949 FO800/455. 
109
 Bateman minute 31 Jan. 1949 FO371/77397/N1083. 
110
 JP(49)14 Norway and the North Atlantic Pact, COS(49)21st mtg 9 Feb. 1949 DEFE4/19. 
111
 Bevin and Jebb conversation with Lange 14 Feb. 1949 FO371/77398/N1656. 
112
 Martin H. Folly, ‘Britain and the Issue of Italian membership of NATO, 1948-49’, Review of International 
Studies, xiii (1987), 188-90. 
113
 FO to Franks 5 March 1949 FO371/79230/Z1959; COS(49)38th mtg 7 March 1949 DEFE4/20. 
114
 Collier to FO 25 Feb. 1949 FO371/77399/N1930; Lange returned from Washington convinced that a 
Scandinavian pact separate from a western group could not count on political or military support, Riste, ‘Was 
1949 a Turning Point?’, 133. 
                                                                                                                23 
Morgenstierne’s application. The FO changed its mind and agreed that a Norwegian 
representative should join the final talks, though pressing that he not be allowed to raise any 
new points that might delay matters.
115
  
France did not feel the same obligation to consider Norwegian sensitivities, and was 
concerned to maintain its own centrality in the geographic coverage of the pact.
116
 After a 
disputatious ambassadors meeting on 1 March in Washington accepted that Norway should 
join the talks, on 3 March the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact, prompted by 
France, said it preferred Norway should sign the treaty later, alongside other small powers, 
so that they could have no influence on the text.
117
 The FO reversed itself again and 
supported this, and Jebb explicitly acknowledged to Norwegian Ambassador Per Preben 
Prebensen on 4 March that this was to avoid small powers raising questions that would 
delay proceedings – that is, trying to have any input into the treaty they were going to be 
asked to sign.
118
 
 Congressional sensitivities took precedence, however, and it was finally decided that 
all proposed members be invited to sign at the same time as the principals, although only 
Norway would have attended any of the talks. Bevin remarked to the Cabinet that Sweden 
might well have been drawn in as well, if proceedings could have been ‘more leisurely’, but 
he still preferred to put no pressure on Sweden to alter its stance, which had defaulted back 
to isolation.
119
 The COS the day before had reiterated their preference for the Scandinavian 
defence bloc that Sweden had failed to achieve – illustrating once more that the impetus for 
the North Atlantic pact was political, not military.
120
 
 
Conclusion 
It is evident that the formation of British policy was a matter of considerable debate, and 
that British concepts of western defence were a complex matter, shaped by Britain’s global 
defence dilemmas. By analysing British policy on the issue of Scandinavia during the 
genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty, this paper sheds fresh light on what has been described 
as ‘the diplomacy of pragmatism’ conducted by Bevin and other British policy-makers as 
they worked to create a workable post-war alliance to serve a multiplicity of British 
interests. While Britain was a major driving force behind the formulation of the treaty, it 
was not on the basis of a single vision of what was wanted or consensus on a ‘middle way’: 
there was much internal debate and inconsistency as political considerations came into 
conflict with military imperatives. British stances regarding a range of significant issues 
cannot be understood if British policy is simply presented as a unitary whole.  Bureaucratic 
compromises between officials and planners made British input into the negotiations that 
shaped the North Atlantic treaty more inconsistent and contradictory than is usually 
acknowledged. Moreover, British pragmatism at times defaulted into indecision, leaving it 
prone to hijacking by a person of unambiguous views, such as Laurence Collier in Oslo. 
 It would be wrong to assume, therefore, that British policy can be explained by a 
simple formula. Rather than energetically and single-mindedly seeking a North Atlantic 
pact that included Norway and Denmark – indeed was conceived in order to include them – 
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and draw the Cold War demarcation line between east and west through the middle of the 
Scandinavian peninsula, multiple British policy imperatives drew them to prefer a graded 
system, in which Norway and Denmark were linked to the western system, but were 
actually defended by arrangements with Sweden that would leave them half in and half out 
of the western bloc. A Soviet attack on the region was not believed to be likely: the threat, 
especially after the events in Czechoslovakia, was seen more to be Soviet subversion using 
domestic communists. Such a half-and-half arrangement would, it was hoped give the 
Scandinavians a better sense of security, and ability therefore to counter such a threat, than 
exposure to the fact that the British did not, contrary to what most assumed, see the region 
as so vital that it had to commit forces to its defence. Although the idea of graded 
membership lost favour during the Washington discussions, analysing the Scandinavian 
issue shows that the British continued to be attached to the concept up to the end of 
February 1949, and indeed, the acceptance of Norwegian reservations about the placing of 
NATO bases in Norway, meant that a degree of limited membership was actually 
established – though it went nowhere near as far as the British had thought might be 
preferable, if the consequence was a definite Swedish connection to the Scandinavian 
members of NATO.
121
 Although Britain strongly desired the alliance for long-term 
purposes, they tried where possible to shape it to meet their short-term needs. They could 
not achieve this aim in this instance, because it simply did not fit the realities of the 
situation, in terms of US congressional opinion, Swedish attitudes, relations between the 
Nordic states, and Soviet policies. The result was that NATO, while it achieved the prime 
goal of US involvement in the defence of Western Europe left other aspects of Britain’s 
defence dilemma unresolved. 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
 Aunesluoma, ‘Staunchest Friends’, 68. Bevin had misgivings about the consequences of the North Atlantic 
pact butting right up against the  Soviet bloc, minuting in February 1949, ‘It is clear now, I think, that we shall 
get a reaction by Russia if there is any Pact with a country which touches their frontier’. This was the case, of 
course, for Norway, which had a common frontier with the USSR itself, Bevin minute Feb 1949 (undated) 
FO371/77403/N1387.  
